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I.
Introduction
The notion that peoples fleeing hardship should be afforded a
welcome in foreign lands is one that has been articulated and
applied in many spheres of human life, including ancient traditions
on hospitality, religious doctrine, and philosophical teachings. This
principle has been applied for thousands of years across all regions
of the world, cultures, and time.
More recently, the twentieth century saw the principles of
protections
for
forcibly
displaced
people
enshrined
in several international legal instruments and declarations. An
important milestone was Article 14(1) of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (“UDHR”), adopted in 1948, providing that
“[e]veryone has the right to seek and enjoy asylum from
persecution.”1 This groundbreaking document was soon followed
by the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“1951
Convention”), defining a refugee as someone who left his or her
country of origin and is unable or unwilling to return because of a

1 Frances Nicholson & Judith Kumin, A Guide to International Refugee Protection
and Building States Asylum Systems, Inter-Parliamentary Union & United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees Vol. 27, at 27 (2017), https://www.unhcr.org/3d4aba564.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z462-HDST].
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serious threat to life or freedom.2 Refugees are entitled to protection
from being forcibly returned to their country of origin—the
principle of non-refoulement.3
The 1967 Protocol to the
Convention (“1967 Protocol”) provided further protection by
removing the temporal and geographic limits to refugee status found
in the Convention.4
Today, international legal protections for refugees are more
relevant than ever. Fueled largely by armed conflict—and
particularly an increase in intrastate conflicts—the number of
forcibly displaced people has grown exponentially since 2007, from
42.7 million to 70.8 million.5 Conflict has forced people across
international borders, creating a global refugee population of 25.9
million people.6 The number of displaced people is now higher than
at any time in human history.7 This cultural context requires
Id.
Id. There is a difference between a refugee and an asylum seeker. The latter is the
general designation for one seeking international protection. In some countries, it is a legal
term for someone who has applied for refugee status and not yet received a final decision
on his or her claim.
4 Id.
5 Global Trends 2017, UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (last
visited Sep. 10, 2021), https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2017/ [https://perma.cc/DP4DVPAR]; Global Trends 2018, UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (last
visited Sept. 10, 2021), https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2018/ [https://perma.cc/NSE7LWEA].
6 UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, Worldwide displacement
tops 70 million, UN Refugee Chief urges greater solidarity in response (June 18, 2019),
https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/press/2019/6/5d03b22b4/worldwide-displacementtops-70-million-un-refugee-chief-urges-greater-solidarity.html [https://perma.cc/5MQ6W2MZ].
7 Upon the establishment of the Office of the United Nations High Commission for
Refugees in 1951, there were roughly one million refugees under its control. That number
in 1993 was about 17.5 million refugees, plus another 2.5 million refugees under the
auspices of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees in the near
East and over 25 million internally displaced persons. See United Nations Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights, Fact Sheet No. 20, Human Rights and Refugees,
REFWORLD (1993) [hereinafter Fact Sheet 20], https://www.refworld.org
/docid/4794773f0.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2021) [https://perma.cc/X496-G57U]. Per
UNCHR, in 2017, there were 19.6 million refugees worldwide, an increase from 9.9
million in 2012. See An Overview of U.S. Refugee Law and Policy, AMERICAN
IMMIGRATION COUNCIL (Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org
/sites/default/files/research/an_overview_of_us_refugee_law_and_policy_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L657-93DF]. At the end of 2020, 82.4 million people were forcibly
displaced due to conflict, persecution, violence, and human rights violations. See Global
Trends in Forced Displacement - 2020, UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR
2
3

26

N.C. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XLVII

revisiting the role of the United States, a historical shaper of
international legal norms on displacement and a key destination
country for refuge seekers.
The United States endorsed the UDHR and, though it is not a
signatory to the 1951 Convention, signed onto the 1967 Protocol,
which incorporates by reference the 1951 Convention’s tenets.8 The
country has long held a strong reputation for refugee resettlement.9
However, this perception has been increasingly challenged recently
with the enactment of a series of restrictions ostensibly aimed at
reducing refugee movement into the United States.10 Apart from
reducing quotas for accepting resettlement, other measures have
been undertaken that slow down the resettlement process, including
extra security measures for screening applicants.11 This amendment
resulted in long waiting periods before the refugees’ claims were
processed and before a determination was made as to their legal
status.12 As discussed below, in many cases, these refugees were
required to wait in a third country while the United States
considered their applications for asylum.13 Consequently, as
reported by human rights groups, some of these refugees were
exposed to dangerous situations in these third countries.14
REFUGEES, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/statistics/unhcrstats/60b638e37/global-trendsforced-displacement-2020.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2021) [https://perma.cc/CFR5BH4N].
8 Human Rights First, Asylum Law and Procedure, Human Rights First,
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/asylum/asylumlaw-and-procedure (last visited April 21,
2021), [https://perma.cc/R6LF-ZMSK].
9 See Brittany Blizzard & Jeanne Batalova, Refugees and Asylum in the United
States-Migration Policy, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE, (June 13, 2019),
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/refugees-and-asylees-united-states-2018
[https://perma.cc/X7X6-G6BX].
10 An Overview of U.S. Refugee Law and Policy, American Immigration Council
(Jan.
5,
2018),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/
research/an_overview_of_us_refugee_law_and_policy_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L65793DF].
11 See id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id. In carrying out restrictive measures against refugees, the then administration
entered into agreements with third countries whereby the third country would keep the
migrant in their country while he or she was seeking asylum in the United States. For
example, the United States, in collaboration with Mexico, created programs in Mexico
with the goal of stopping asylum seekers from Central America from ever getting to the
United States. border. Most of these countries did not only lack the infrastructure to harbor
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Subsequently, in 2017, the United States settled a far lower number
of refugees (in proportion to size) than the rest of the world.15
This article delves into the issues surrounding the United States
government’s policy change towards the rights of displaced people.
First, I will analyze the legal foundations for restricting refugees and
examine whether these restrictions represent possible
contraventions of international treatises and domestic policies.
Second, I will explore the deterrence policies used by States to
undermine refugee laws and the principle of non-refoulment, as well
as the processes and strategies to lessen these policies. Finally, I
will review what lessons have been learned to avoid repeating the
recent mistakes and scandals that led to mass detentions on the
United States’ southern border of children and their families fleeing
violence in South America.
II. The International Legal Framework for Protecting
Refugees
A. The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
and the 1967 Protocol
As indicated above, the core of international refugee law is
embodied in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees. Per the definition of a refugee under the 1951
Convention, refugee status is granted only to people who became
refugees because of events occurring before January 1, 1951.16 But
States were given the discretion to extend that definition to
encompass events that occurred in Europe as well as in other parts
of the world.17 However, because the refugee crisis grew in the
1950s and 1960s, it became obvious that the limitation of the
temporal and geographical reach of the 1951 Convention was
inadequate.18 This realization resulted in the adoption of the 1967
asylum seekers, but were also unsafe because of violence, gangs, drug cartels, which all
subjected these migrants to unsafe living conditions. See Ariel G. Ruiz Soto, One Year
after the U.S.-Mexico Agreement: Reshaping Mexico’s Migration Policies, MIGRATION
POLICY INSTITUTE (June 2020) https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/
publications/OneYearAfterUS-MexAgreement-EN-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/6JPZM5XX].
15 American Immigration Council, supra note 10.
16 Nicholson & Kumin, supra note 1, at 16.
17 See id.
18 Id.
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Protocol to the Convention (“1967 Protocol”).19 The effect of the
1967 Protocol was to eliminate the temporal and geographical
barriers in the 1951 Convention. The 1967 Protocol expanded the
1951 Convention to deal with “new refugees” who met part of the
1951 Convention’s definition but would become refugees only
because of actions that took place after January 1, 1951.20
Consequently, State parties acceding to the 1967 Protocol were not
bound by temporal or geographical limitations of the 1951
Convention, but would apply all Protocol Articles (1-34) to all
persons to whom the refugee definition would otherwise apply.21 In
other words, the 1967 Protocol eliminated the “previously existing
temporal and geographical restrictions on refugee classification.”22
Given that most of the States tend to accede to the 1951 Convention
and the 1967 Protocol, it reinforces that States find them crucial to
international refugee protection.23
B. Definition of Refugee per the 1951 Convention
A refugee under Article 1 of the 1951 Convention is a person
who (1) has a well-founded fear of being persecuted because of his
or her race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group, or political opinion; (2) is outside his or her country of origin
or habitual residence; (3) is unable or unwilling to avail him or
herself of the protection of that country, or to return there, because
of fear of persecution; and (4) is not explicitly excluded from
refugee protection or whose refugee status has not ceased because
of circumstances.24 Thus, one would automatically become a
refugee if the criteria above is met, rather than the status being based
on a positive decision following an application. As such, the status
as a refugee is declaratory.25
C. Distinction between a Refugee and an Asylum Seeker
A refugee, as defined above, is someone “who has left his or her
country of origin and is unable to return or unwilling to return there
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 18.
Id.
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because of a serious threat to his or her life or freedom.”26 A refugee
has rights under the 1951 Convention, including rights based on the
principles of non-refoulement.27 This principle protects refugees
from forcibly being returned to their country of origin where there
is a substantial likelihood that the person will be in danger.28
Although the word asylum is not defined in international law
per se, asylum seeker is the umbrella term for someone seeking
international protection. In some countries, asylum is “a legal term
referring to a person who has applied for refugee status and has not
yet received a final decision on his or her claim.”29 Thus, it is worth
noting that not every asylum seeker ultimately winds up as a
refugee, though States should ensure due process is given to asylum
seekers and ensure that asylum seekers are not simply returned to
their countries of origin.30
The word migrant is also sometimes conflated with refugee, but
the two should be distinguished, as they have different implications.
A migrant is one who deliberately exercises the choice to move for
personal reasons, such as education, family reunion, or to find work,
but not from the threat of persecution in their country of origin.31
Consequently, migrants are free to go back to their countries of
origin and enjoy whatever protections their governments may
provide.32
International refugee law does not operate in isolation. The legal
scheme is inextricably intertwined with international human rights
law and various conventions. Thus, it is necessary to address the
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and two other
applicable conventions.

Id. at 17.
Id.
28 Id. Article 33 of the Convention provides that “no Contracting State shall expel
or return (refouler) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where
his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR Note on the Principle of Non-Refoulement,
REFWORLD
(Nov.
1997), https://www.refworld.org/doc
id/438c6d972.html [https://perma.cc/5K9C-EUGE].
29 Nicholson & Kumin, supra note 1, at 17.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
26
27
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D. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights
With the painful memories of violence and mass suffering from
two world wars, drafters the Charter of the United Nations urged the
signatories to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of
war.”33
The United Nations was asked to help achieve
“international cooperation in solving international problems of an
economic, social, or humanitarian character.”34 Likewise, the
United Nations was tasked with encouraging respect for human
rights and protecting fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.35 Consequently, an
issue of prime importance for the United Nations was the plight of
“refugees, displaced persons, stateless persons and returnees, all
uprooted by war and in need of assistance.”36 The plight of these
refugees was therefore not only an international refugee problem,
but also a humanitarian one.37
In 1946, the General Assembly established the International
Refugee Organization (“IRO”), which received an interim mandate
to “register, protect, resettle and repatriate refugees.”38 However,
the IRO’s role was short-lived due to post war political issues and
inadequate funding.39
The IRO was superseded by the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees, which was created “to provide
protection to refugees and to seek durable solutions for refugees by
assisting governments to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of
refugees, or their integration within new national communities.”40
In so doing, the tenets of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
play an essential and integral role in effectuating that goal.
The UDHR is a landmark document in the history of human
rights. The importance of the UDHR’s principles is embodied not
only in what States do, but also in the foundation for the
International Bill of Rights and several other essential human rights

33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

Fact Sheet 20, supra note 7, at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Fact Sheet 20, supra note 7, at 3.
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agreements.41 In December 1948, the United Nations General
Assembly proclaimed the UDHR a common standard of
achievements for all peoples and all nations.42 The UDHR holds
that “[a]ll Human Beings are born free and equal in dignity and
rights.”43 Article 14 provides for the right to seek asylum, stating
that “everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries
asylum from persecution.”44 Article 13(2) also articulates this right
by stating that “everyone has the right to leave any country,
including his own.”45 While the UDHR is not a legally binding
instrument, it is an authoritative expression of customary
international law as it pertains to human rights.46 Notably, as a
Resolution of the U.N. General Assembly, UDHR’s provisions are
not legally binding on Member States, especially given that these
provisions are not to be signed by United Nations Members.
However, the UDHR, while not a treaty per se, is still very
influential in human rights.47
41 Article 1 of UDHR provides that “All human beings are born free and equal in
dignity and rights.” Many recognized and major treaties, were ratified thanks to their
origins to the UDHR, and they include:
The International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
(1965).
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966).
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966).
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (1979).
The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (1984).
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989).
Claude Welch, Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Why does it matter?, UB NOW
(2015),
http://www.buffalo.edu/ubnow/stories/2015/12/qa_welch_udhr.html
[https://perma.cc/E8KQ-TXR6].
42 See G.A. Res 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
43 Id. at art. 1.
44 Id. at art. 14.
45 Id. at art. 13(2).
46 A rule or norm of Customary International law is one that is binding on all states
whether it is found in a treaty to which the State is a party. Human rights are generally
viewed as “norms of Customary International Law” and more so, provisions of the UDHR
are considered a part of customary international law. United Nations Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights and Refugee Protection (RLD 5), at 22
(Oct.
1995)
[hereinafter
RLD
5]
[https://www.unhcr.org/3ae6bd900.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R6ZQ-LV5X].
47 The purpose of the UDHR was “to provide an authoritative understanding of the
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E. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees
The U.N. General Assembly, in its Resolution 319A of
December 3, 1949, created the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”).48 Per Article 1 of the
Statute, the function of the High Commissioner is “to provide
protection to refugees and to seek durable solutions for refugees by
assisting governments to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of
refugees, or their integration within new national communities.”49
The task under the auspices of the High Commissioner under the
statute is broadly classified as “humanitarian and social and of an
entirely non-political character.”50 State parties, per Article 35(1)

human rights guaranteed in the U.N. Charter; it is the most well-known U.N. catalogue of
Human Rights, and it includes civil and political, as well as economic, social and cultural
rights; and its importance has been consistently reaffirmed in resolutions of General
Assembly, and many national constitutions make reference to it or incorporate its
provisions.” See id.
48 Fact Sheet 20, supra note 7, at 3.
49 Id.
50 G.A. Res. 428(v), Statute of the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees,
(Dec. 14, 1950). The High Commissioner shall provide for the protection of refugees
falling under the competence of his Office by: (a) Promoting the conclusion and
ratification of international conventions for the protection of refugees, supervising their
application, and proposing amendments thereto;
(b) Promoting through special agreements with Governments the execution of any
measures calculated to improve the situation of refugees and to reduce the number
requiring protection;
(c) Assisting governmental and private efforts to promote voluntary repatriation
or assimilation within new national communities;
(d) Promoting the admission of refugees, not excluding those in the most destitute
categories, to the territories of States;
(e) Endeavoring to obtain permission for refugees to transfer their assets and
especially those necessary for their resettlement;
(f) Obtaining from Governments information concerning the number and
conditions of refugees in their territories and the laws and regulations concerning
them;
(g) Keeping in close touch with the Governments and intergovernmental
organizations concerned;
(h) Establishing contact in such manner as he may think best with private
organizations dealing with refugee questions;
(i) Facilitating the co-ordination of the efforts of private organizations concerned
with the welfare of refugees.
Id.
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of the 1951 Convention “undertake to cooperate with the Office of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees . . . in the
exercise of its functions and shall in particular facilitate its duty of
supervising the application of the provisions of this Convention.”51
In exercising this supervisory role, the UNHCR has propagated its
own interpretation of the 1951 Convention provisions as well as
provided its opinion to national courts all over the world.52
The work of the High Commissioner and the United Nations in
safeguarding human rights is a symbiotic fusion in the protection of
human dignity. Examining some international organizations
relevant to refugee protection and human rights would be
illuminating to the benign symbiotic relations between and amongst
these organizations.
III.

International Treatises/Conventions Related to
Refugees’ Protections and Human Rights

A. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(“ICCPR”) was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1966 and
came into force in 1976.53 The preamble states the following:
[T]hese rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human
person . . . in accordance with the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the ideal of free human beings enjoying civil and
political freedom and freedom from fear and want can only be
achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy
his civil and political rights, as well as his economic, social and
cultural rights.54

The ICCPR compels governments to take administrative,
judicial, and legislative measures to protect the rights embodied in
the treaty, which include the “right to life; the right to liberty and
security of person; to liberty of movement within the State” and “the
right not to be subjected to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading

51 United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights, Human Rights and Refugee
Protection, Self-Study Module 5, Vol. 1, at 24 (Dec. 15, 2006), https://www.unhcr.org/
45a7acb72.pdf [https://perma.cc/CD7E-AFD5].
52 Id.
53 Id. at 34.
54 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
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treatment.”55 The ICCPR is the appropriate and specific treaty that
relates to asylum litigation. The Human Rights Committee, a
monitoring body established by the ICCPR, receives State Party
complaints, then issues comments as necessary or applicable.56 The
ICCPR, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (“ICESR”), and the UDHR are together known as
the International Bill of Human Rights.57
B. The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
The importance of the Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”) to
refugee law lies in the fact that many applications for refugee status
are often a result of torture and others means of maltreatment. This
treaty bans the forced return of persons to places where there is a
likelihood of torture to be encountered (refoulement). That is, nonrefoulement is a fundamental principle under which a person
running away from persecution should not be expected to leave his
or her country of origin and enter another in a normal or usual
manner. Thus, the principle of non-refoulement prohibits any
measure that would result in a refugee being sent back into the arms
of their persecutors.58 The non-refoulement provision of the CAT
is not limited to persons already recognized as refugees. 59 Thus,
persons who may have missed an application deadline for refugee
status, were given an erroneous denial of status, or reside where
there no laws are in place to handle the refugee process may still be
able to receive assistance.60
The CAT’s non-refoulement provision is absolute and allows
for no limitation or derogation from the provision, unlike the 1951
Convention provision.61

Nicholson & Kumin, supra note 1, at 26.
Inna Nazarova, Alienating Human from Right: U.S. and UK Non-Compliance with
Asylum Obligations Under International Human Rights Law, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
1335, 1347 (2002).
57 RLD 5, supra note 46, at 34.
58 See B. Shaw Drake & Elizabeth Gibson, Vanishing Protection: Access to Asylum
at the Border, 21 CUNY L. REV. 91, 100 (2017).
59 Nicholson & Kumin, supra note 1, at 24.
60 Id.
61 Id.
55
56
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The CAT established a committee against torture, which was
empowered to hear complaints from individuals against a State
Party.62 However, the entertainment of the complaint by the
committee derives from the acknowledgement by the State of the
committee’s competence to receive and act on the complaint.63
C. The Convention on the Rights of the Child64
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”) applies to
all children in or out of their country of origin without
discrimination.65 Under the CRC, a child means “means every
human being below the age of eighteen years unless, under the law
applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.”66 Ratified by
virtually every country in the world, the CRC is an almost
universally popular convention.67 In addition, there are also child
refugees and asylum seekers, which all fall under the auspices of the
convention and its tenets. Some notable tenets of the CRC
applicable to all children include: Article 2, the principle of nondiscrimination; Article 3, the principle of the best interest of the
child; Article 6, the right to survival and development; and, Article
12, the right to be heard.68 As related to refugee children, this
convention addresses the child’s right to be with the parent and not
be separated from them against their will.69 However, child

Id.
Id.
64 The Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 44
[hereinafter Convention on the Rights of the Child]. The Convention in Article 3 (1) states
that: “[i]n all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best
interest of the child shall be a primary consideration.” Id. at art 3(1).
65 See id. at art. 2.
66 Id. at art. 1.
67 The United States is one of three countries that has not ratified the United Nations
Convention on the child. 25th Anniversary of the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
HUMAN
RIGHTS
WATCH
(Nov.
17,
2014,
11:50AM
EST),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/11/17/25th-anniversary-convention-rights-child
[https://perma.cc/SCW7-ZHWZ]. Its rationale for not ratifying the Convention is that it
would limit its sovereignty or interfere with family life. See Lida Minasyan, The United
States has not Ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, ATLAS CORPS, (Sept.
30, 2018), https://atlascorps.org/the-united-states-has-not-ratified-the-un-convention-onthe-rights-of-the-child/ [https://perma.cc/W4MC-4WNJ].
68 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 64, at art. 2, 3, 6, 12.
69 Nicholson & Kumin, supra note 1, at 24.
62
63
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separation from the parents could be a viable option if in the best
interest of the child per Article 9; family reunification Article 10;
and the right to “special protection and assistance” by a State as
identified under Article 20.70 Article 22 also states any child
requesting refugee status, or who is already a refugee, has a right to
protection and humanitarian assistance to enjoy the rights as
provided in the CRC.71
D. Rights of Refugees and the Principle of Non-Refoulement
Refoulement is the foundation of international refugee
protection.72 It provides that a refugee has the right to be protected
from forced expulsion/return (“refoulement”).73 Article 33(1) of the
1951 Convention states “[n]o Contracting State shall expel or return
[(“refouler”)] a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers
of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on
account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion.”74 This principle applies to State
parties that would be involved in any manner that may place the
refugee directly or indirectly at risk of being returned to the country
of origin.75 Consequently, asylum seekers whose claims have not
yet been considered or formally recognized are protected under this
principle.76 Other international and human rights instruments also
tend to recognize the principle of refoulement if the person is to be
exposed to “torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment,”
regardless of the status of a person as a refugee.77
70 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 64, at art. 9, 10, 20. The “best
interest” term broadly describes the well-being of a child. The Convention neither
provides a precise definition, nor unambiguously outlines common factors of the best
interests of the child. However, it instructs that “[s]uch well-being is determined by a
variety of individual circumstances, such as the age, the level of maturity of the child, the
presence or absence of parents, the child’s environment and experiences. Its interpretation
and application must conform with the Convention and other international legal norms.”
See UNHCR Guidelines on Determining the Best Interests of the Child, UNITED NATIONS
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, 14 (May 2008) https://www.unhcr.org/
4566b16b2.pdf.
71 Id.
72 Nicholson & Kumin, supra note 1, at 20.
73 G.A. Res. 429 (V), at art. 33 (Apr. 22, 1954) [hereinafter The 1951 Convention].
74 Id. at art. 33(1).
75 Nicholson & Kumin, supra note 1, at 20.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 26. See e.g., The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or
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Some critics argue that most of asylum seekers are not “true
refugees.”78 Instead, they are considered economic migrants,
leading to many countries rejecting applications for asylum under
the literal reading of the 1951 definition of refugee.79 However,
clearly distinguishing between a refugee and an economic migrant
may be challenging. From a human rights perspective, regardless
of whether that person is escaping persecution, conflict or is running
from abject poverty, he or she is supposed to be treated according
to the basic standards of human rights.80
It is worth saying that the prohibition on refoulement as
discussed is not absolute. As indicated in Article 33(2) of the 1951
Convention, a refugee may not avail himself or herself to the
prohibition on refoulement upon the occurrence of some
conditions.81 For example, if “there are reasonable grounds for
regarding [that refugee] as a danger to the security of the country in
which he [or she] is [present or if] having been convicted by a final
judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the
community . . . .”82 In such an instance, that refugee may not avail
himself or herself to the prohibition on non-refoulment.
The question remains as to how effective the principle of nonrefoulement under the 1951 Convention can be, especially given
that some states are not parties to the Convention.83 This principle
has been widely accepted and, therefore, considered a norm of
customary international law.84 Thus, as a norm of customary
international law, States that are not a party to the 1951 Convention
must still honor the principle of non-refoulement as it is binding on
all States.85

Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 3 Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter
Convention Against Torture] (“No state party shall expel, return (“refouler”) or extradite
a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would
be in danger of being subjected to torture.”).
78 Fact Sheet 20, supra note 7, at 8 (“[Some countries contend that the majority of
asylum seekers are in fact not refugees but economic migrants.”).
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 See The 1951 Convention, supra note 73, at 176.
82 Id.
83 Nicholson & Kumin, supra note 1, at 53.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 20.
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The United States Refugee Law and Policy

A. Historical Background
The United States acceded to the 1967 Protocol of the
International Convention on Refugees in 1968.86 Although prior to
joining, U.S. law showed some resemblance to the provisions of the
1951 Convention, U.S. law did not require any compliance with the
Convention or its Protocol.87 However, the United States Congress
codified the main provisions of the 1951 Convention and its
Protocol through the Refugee Act of 1980 (“1980 Act”).88 This
1980 Act adopted both the 1951 Convention’s definition of
“refugee” and “refoulement,” with the latter being based on Article
33 of the Convention and referred to in the United States as
“withholding of removal.”89 Congress’ legislative intent in passing
the 1980 Act was to conform U.S. law to international refugee law.90
This intent is bolstered by the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in
INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca91 that “one of Congress’ primary purposes
was to bring United States refugee law into conformance with the
1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to Status of Refugees.”92
The Refugee Act of 1980 was passed as an amendment to the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”).93 The definition of
refugee under the INA is:
Any person who is outside any country of such person’s
nationality . . . and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is
unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection
of, that country because of persecution . . . on account of race,

86 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Oct. 4, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267
[hereinafter The 1967 Protocol].
87 Note, American Courts and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees: A Need for
Harmony in the Face of a Refugee Crisis, 131 HARV L. REV. 1399. 1401 (2018)
[hereinafter American Courts and the UNHCR].
88 Id.
89 Id. at 1402; See also Bhargava Ray, infra note 97, at 146 (stating that withholding
would be an important relief especially in cases where the asylum application is not filed
within one year upon arrival in the United States or the induvial is “firmly resettled” in
another country before arrival in the United States.).
90 Bhargava Ray, infra note 95, at 140.
91 I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
92 Id. at 437.
93 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212 § 201, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
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religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion.94

Thus, in the absence of any other impediment barring asylum,
one would qualify for the asylum status.95 However, this definition
was amended in 1996 to include persons affected by forced
population control policies.96 Under this amendment, a person who
is forced to have an abortion or undergo sterilization, or is
persecuted for failure to comply with the population control policy,
“has been persecuted on account of political opinion . . . [and has] a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of political opinion.”97
Only at the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of
Homeland Security could this relief be afforded to anyone.98
For the most part, U.S. refugee law begins with an application
for asylum, as established by the Refugee Act and the language of
the 1951 Convention.99 The application is filed affirmatively by a
non-citizen with the United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services (“USCIS”), a part of the Department of Homeland Security
(“DHS”).100 An application can also be filed defensively as a noncitizen before an immigration judge in a removal proceeding.101 An
immigration judge reviews the decision of the USCIS, which in turn
is reviewable by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).102
Once refugees pass their security screening and fit into the
predetermined number of permitted refugees admission cap for the
year, they qualify for resettlement in the United States.103 After an

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012).
Shalini Bhargava Ray, Applying the U.S. Constitution to Foreign Asylum Seekers:
Exposing a Curious, Inconsistent Practice in the Federal Courts, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 137,
146 (2016).
96 Id.
97 Id. at n.57.
98 Id. at 146.
99 American Courts and the UNCHR, supra note 87, at 1402.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id. The BIA is an immigration administrative review body within the Department
of Justice’s Executive Office. Although the decisions of BIA have no precedential value
per se, some decision results in the Executive’s standard practice, while others are
reviewable by federal courts.
103 An Overview of U.S. Refugee Law and Policy, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, at 4, (Jan.
8, 2020) [hereinafter AIC Fact Sheet], https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/
research/overview-us-refugee-law-and-policy [https://perma.cc/X4NZ-KYAZ].
94
95
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initial determination by the President in consultation with Congress
of this numerical limitation (ceiling) for refugees admission and
what that should be in a particular year, different refugee population
are assessed by DHS and the State Department.104 This assessment
also takes into consideration the ability of the government to process
them for admission.105 In 2019, the ceiling for refugee admission
was 30,000—lower than the previous year’s total of 45,000, which
even was also considered low comparatively.106 In 2018, the
greatest number of refugees were from Africa with 10,459 (45.5 %);
Near East/South Asia with 3,797 (16.9%); East Asia with 3,668
(16.3%); Europe with 3,612 (16.1%); and Latin America with 955
(4.2%).107 In 2020, the ceiling was reduced to only 18,000.108 But,
according to the Refugee Processing Center, only 11,814 refugees
were actually resettled, running below the projected numbers for the
year.109 For 2021, there was a proposal to admit just 15,000, which
is the lowest level in the program’s history.110 From 2016 to 2020,
the number of refugees admitted to the United States dropped by
eighty-six percent.111
Refugees are resettled upon admission and shepherded for
necessary services by the Refugee Admission Program (“RAP”), a
program which is administered by the Bureau of Population,
Refugee, and Migration (“PRM”).112 RAP conducts their program
in conjunction with the Office of Refugee Resettlement (“ORR”),
the latter being part of the Department of Health and Human
Services and the former being part of the Department of State.113
The U.S. refugee program provides three major categories under
which persons can seek asylum, but it does not promise that asylumId. at 2.
Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Silva Mathema & Sofia Carratala, Rebuilding the U.S. Refugee Program for the
21st Century, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 26, 2020, 9:02 AM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/reports/2020/10/26/492342/rebuil
ding-u-s-refugee-program-21st-century/#:~:text=Every%20year%2C%
[https://perma.cc/5MQJ-WEL3].
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 AIC Fact Sheet, supra note 103, at 4.
113 Id.
104
105
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seekers will be admitted.114 The first category is Priority One.115
These are individuals referred to the United States by UNCHR or
recognized by a U.S. embassy or an NGO as facing “compelling
persecution needs” with no other lasting solution for them.116 Next
is Priority Two, consisting of groups with “special concerns” to the
United States as carefully chosen by the Department of State and
supported by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service
(USCIS), UNCHR, and NGOs.117 The final category is Priority
Three. This category includes the relatives of refugees who are
already settled in the United States.118 The settled refugee is
required to file an Affidavit of Relationship (“AOR”) that is handled
by the Department of Homeland Security.119
Although it is the prerogative of the government to reject the
application of refugees on any grounds, DHS, in January 2018,
added “additional security enhancements and recommendations to
strengthen the integrity of the U.S Refugee Admissions
Program.”120 Thus, required additional screening of people from
“high-risk” countries is not unusual, as the government may take
into consideration the risk-based nature of countries and individuals
in the program.121
Once a conditional acceptance of the refugee for resettlement
has been made, the Resettlement Support Center (“RSC”) requests
assurance that the refugee will be placed in the United States. 122
Then the Refugee Processing Center (“RPC”), alongside private
voluntary agencies (“VOLAGs”), proceeds to establish where the
refugee will be sent.123 Once established where the refugee will be
Id.
Id.
116 Id.
117 Id. (noting that there are some people from Burma, Iraq, and the Soviet Union).
118 Id. (explaining that this includes spouses and unmarried children under 21).
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 5.
123 Id. Once the IOM receives information on the travels, VOLAG organizes the
pickup and transportation of the refugee from the airport to their home destination. Id.
Should the refugee already have a relative in the United States, that fact is taken into
consideration in trying to ensure the refuge is settled in proximity to where that relative is.
Id. The VOLAG is to make sure that the first 90 days of the refugee stay is catered for in
terms of housing, food, clothing, employment and all the relevant necessities to settle
114
115
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settled and medical examinations and security clearance are
successfully completed, RSC and the International Organization for
Migration (“IOM”) collaborate to schedule refugee travel to the
United States.124 However, the cost of the trip is not free for the
refugee, as the refugee must sign a promissory note that he or she
will repay the United States the incurred cost prior to leaving for the
United States.125 Although this loan is interest-free, the refugee is
expected to begin making payments six months after arriving in the
country.126
A year after the refugee is admitted into the United States, the
refugee may apply for Permanent Resident Status and could
subsequently apply for naturalization five years later.127 The general
processing timeframe for refugee resettlement in the United States
ranged, on average, from 18-24 months in 2016.128 However, in
2017, the process of vetting and screening refugees became more
complicated as DHS, under the Trump administration, raised the
bar.129
B. Policy Under the Trump Administration: The Changing
Landscape of Refugee Law
Immediately after entering office in 2017, the Trump
administration changed refugee resettlement in the United States
unexpectedly. President Trump issued an executive order that
suspended the U.S. refugee admission program for 120 days.130 The
down. Id.
124 Id.
125 Id. The loan is provided through the Department of State and the Department of
Health and Human Services, in particular the State Department’s Reception and Placement
(R&P) Program provides the loan. These matters are complex and handled by multiple
departments-and really not unusual. Factsheet: U.S. Refugee Resettlement, [hereinafter
U.S. Refugee Resettlement Factsheet], NAT’L IMMIGR. F., (Nov. 5, 2020)
https://immigrationforum.org/article/fact-sheet-u-s-refugee-resettlement/
[https://perma.cc/TD6P-VXQS].
126 AIC Fact Sheet, supra note 103, at 5; See also U.S. Refugee Resettlement
Factsheet, supra note 127 (noting that HHS’s Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR)
provides the refugees with some cash, medical assistance, employment, social services,
and other services after three months).
127 U.S. Refugee Resettlement Factsheet, supra note 127.
128 AIC Fact Sheet, supra note 103, at 5.
129 Id.
130 Ruth Ellen Wasem, More than a Wall: The Rise and Fall of US Asylum and
Refugee Policy, 8 J. ON MIGRATION AND HUM. SEC. 246, 259 (2020).
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administration also suspended the entry of Syrian refugees until
further notice.131 In addition, the Trump administration reduced the
2017 refugee admission maximum ceiling from 110,000, which was
the ceiling under the Obama administration, to 50,000132. The
administration then lowered it to 45,000 in 2018 and then to 30,000
in 2019.133 This change in policy was apparently intended to give
DHS and the State Department sufficient time to carry out security
scrutiny and review of applications and procedures for the
admission of refugees.134
The Trump refugee policies are placed into three categories: (1)
policies that undermine established principles and policies, like the
policy of non-refoulment and due process; (2) policies that prevent
the entry of refugees and asylees; and (3) policies that tend to
criminalize foreigners who are seeking asylum in the United
States.135 These policies have been referred to as the ABCs of the
Trump administration’s policies on refugees: A’s (abandoning), B’s
(blocking), and C’s (criminalizing) on refugees and asylees.136 In
2018, the criminalization policy reached a peak with the “zero
tolerance” policy and in 2019, the policies again brought back all
the ABC policies.137 The “zero tolerance” policy was supposedly
targeted on unauthorized immigration.138 However, under this
policy, any migrant, including an asylum seeker, trying to cross the
U.S. border other than at an authorized port of entry was to be
apprehended and criminally prosecuted.139
Under the Trump Administration, the ABCs were easily
recognizable and obvious.140 For example, the Executive Order of
January 27, 2017 suspended refugee admissions for at least 120
Id.
AIC Fact Sheet, supra note 103, at 5 (stating the admissions ceiling was lowered
to 15,000 in 2018 with fewer than “50 percent admitted”).
133 Id.
134 Id. at 6.
135 Wasem, supra note 130, at 258.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 259.
138 Id. at 260.
139 See Hayley Drozdowski & Fiona Chong, The Trump Zero Tolerance Policy: A
Cruel Approach with Humane and Viable Alternatives, REFUGEES INT’L (July 31, 2018),
https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2018/7/31/trump-zero-tolerance-policy
[https://perma.cc/6WVV-VCB6].
140 See Wasem, supra note 130, at 259.
131
132
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days, blocked Syrian nationals from refugee resettlement, banned
nationals of Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen for 90 days, and
criminalized asylum seekers by expanding their expedited removal
and detention.141 Although no official announcement was made, the
administration turned away asylum seekers who presented
themselves at the ports of entry along the United States-Mexico
border.142 The following year was marked by the height of the
adoption of the “zero tolerance” policy through criminal
prosecutions of all arriving foreign nationals. These criminal
persecutions included asylum seekers trying to enter the country
without authorization, consequently resulting in the separation of
children from their parents as well as criminally going after parents
who crossed the border with children.143
Similarly, policies in 2019 also embraced all three ABC
principles, resulting in Fiscal Year 2020 having the lowest level of
refugee admissions (18,000) since the passage of the Refugee Act
of 1980.144 Policy A was exemplified by third-country deals with
insecure Central American countries to prevent migrants within
their borders from coming to the United States.145 In the same vein,
any arrested foreign national who could not show proof of two years
presence in the United States was removed without the government
(DHS) conducting a hearing.146 Policy B included denying local and
state officials the ability to permit placement of refugees.147 Asylum
seekers who came through Mexico were denied entry by DHS,
instating the Migrant Protection Protocol, which meant they should
remain in Mexico.148 Finally, Policy C included detainment of not
only migrant families, but also of migrant children looking for
asylum, empowering Border Control Officers to screen asylum
claims.149
Although the asylum and refugee laws are not perfect, these
Trump policies demonstrate that the intent and flexible features of

141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149

Id.
Id. at 261 tbl.10.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Wasem, supra note 130, at 261 tb1.10.
Id.
Id.
Id.

2021

CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF ASYLUM AND REFUGEE LAWS

45

the asylum and refugee provisions passed by Congress have been
effective in dealing with the flow of forced migration caused by war,
repression, and persecution.150
The ABC approach has
deconstructed this stability and legal protection and has
“weaponize[d] asylum and refugee policy.”151 Likewise, the Trump
administration indulged in regulations that would restrict even more
access to asylum.152 For example, allowing immigration judges to
reject asylum cases without a hearing streamlined the categories of
persons considered persecuted to exclude most victims of genderbased violence and gang-related violence.153 Contrary to statutory
provisions, the administration sought to prevent an individual who
has been in the United States for over a year from applying for
asylum. The administration carried out “enhanced” protections
screening interviews, referred to as “credible and reasonable fear

150 It has been reported by Human Rights First that as of February 2021, there are “at
least 1,544 publicly reported cases of murder, rape, torture, kidnapping, and other violent
assaults against asylum seekers and migrants forced to return to Mexico by the Trump
Administration.” See Human Rights First, Delivered to Danger: Trump Administration
sending asylum seekers and migrants to danger [hereinafter Delivered to Danger] (Feb.
19,
2021),
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/campaign/remain-mexico
[https://perma.cc/Z6HX-7KSZ]. Of these attacks, are 341 cases of children returned to
Mexico who were kidnapped or nearly kidnapped. Id. In the same vein, 68,000 individuals
returned to Mexico for example have neither been interviewed or even spoken to an
attorney. Id.
151 Delivered to Danger, supra note 150; see also Wasem, supra note 130, at 261
tbl.10.
152 Wasem, supra note 130, at 262.
153 For example, [a] 15-year-old Central American boy who was cognitively impaired
and had the functional development of a five-year-old was murdered and his body found
mutilated after he fled across the border alone; he and his mother were twice expelled to
Reynosa by DHS. According to a declaration by Jennifer Harbury, an attorney assisting
the family, the boy was likely killed for failing to pay a crossing “fee” to gangs that control
the area. The family fled Central America after receiving death threats by gang members
who raped and kidnapped the boy’s sister. See Human Rights Travesty: Biden
Administration Embrace of Trump Asylum Expulsion Policy Endangers Lives, Wreaks
Havoc, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST at 11 (Aug. 2021) [hereinafter Human Rights Travesty],
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/HumanRightsTravesty_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3JFZ-GULX]; see also Human Rights Situation of Refugee and Migrant
Families and Unaccompanied Children in the United States of America, INTER-AMERICAN
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/refugeesmigrants-us.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2021) [hereinafter IACHR Report]. For additional
information, see Human Rights Situation of Refugee & Migrant Families &
Unaccompanied Children in the United States of America, INTER-AMERICAN COMM’N ON
HUM. RIGHTS, (July 14, 2015).
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interviews.”154 The DHS raised the level as to what must be proven
at a preliminary screening interview to the asylum officers.155 Such
screenings are usually conducted by trained and specialized asylum
officers.156 The administration having CBP carry out this function
was a contravention of the law.157 These CBP officers were refusing
asylum seekers at a disproportionate rate.158 The fundamental
question is whether, in so doing, the Trump administration violated
domestic and international law.
C. Was There a Violation of Domestic and/or International
Law Using Refugees’ Deterrence Policies?
As discussed above, the possibility to seek asylum protection in
the United States is a given right in international law as embodied
in the U.S Refugee Act of 1980.159 One who fears persecution from
his or her country of origin is not guaranteed that they would not be
removed in another country. However, the underlying and essential
right to apply for protection from persecution and to have that claim
considered is quintessential to any legal regime complying with
such protection.160 Unfortunately, the United States, under the
Trump administration, established multiple barriers to undermine
the rights of those seeking asylum.161
1. The Principle of Non-Refoulement Under
International Law
One of the sacred and “most urgent need[s] of refugees is to
secure entry into a territory in which they are sheltered from the risk
of being persecuted.”162 Not meeting this principle is tantamount in
See IACHR Report, supra note 153, at 74.
Drake & Gibson, supra note 58, at 95.
156 Id.
157 See National Immigrant Justice Center, Asylum Seekers & Refugees,
https://immigrantjustice.org/issues/asylum-seekers-refugees (last visited Sept. 7, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/WCJ9-SHEJ].
158 Id.
159 Drake & Gibson, supra note 58, at 102.
160 Id. at 93.
161 Id. at 95 (stating that the interviews were made available only to those who had
initially been screened and approved by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers
(CBP) as having met the test for the expression of fear).
162 Id. at 97 (citing JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 279, 279 (1st ed. 2005).).
154
155
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most cases to a breach of international law. Breaching refoulement
is comparable to a violation of international law when a refugee is
deported to his or her country of origin. In so deporting the refugee,
a State flagrantly contravenes its duty to abide by the fundamental
law of non-refoulement.163 This principle, found in Article 33 of the
1951 Convention, is at the heart of international refugee law.164 It
established one of the most “enduring foundations of refugee
protection by setting baseline principles on which the international
protection of refugees was to be built.”165 For example, a person
running away from persecution should not be expected to leave the
country of origin and enter another in a normal or usual manner.166
As a result, the principle of non-refoulement prohibits any measure
that would result in a refugee being “pushed back into the arms of
their persecutors.”167
Scholars agree that Article 33(1) applies to a host country that
rejects a refugee at the frontier as the principle of non-refoulement
covers not only non-return but also non-rejection.168 Thus, the issue
of determining whether a country is in contravention of the nonrefoulement principle should be focused on whether the action of
that country creates room for the return of the person to persecution
as a result of a refusal of the protection sought.169 The issue should
not be whether the person seeking refugee status is within that
country’s territory, in transit, or meets the applicable standard for

Id.
Id. at 99.
165 Id. These principles include: (1) the principle of nonrefoulement; (2) that
protection must be extended to all refugees without discrimination; (3) The problem of
refugees is social and humanitarian in nature, and therefore should not become a cause of
tension between states; and (4) Persons escaping persecution cannot be expected to leave
their country and enter another country in a regular manner, and should not be penalized
for having entered into the country where they seek asylum. Id.
166 Drake & Gibson, supra note 58, at 99.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 101. Article 33 also applies to rejection at the port of a potential host country,
and some scholars support the principle of non-refoulement. See e.g., JAMES C.
HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, 279 (1st ed. 2005);
Mark R. von Sternberg, Reconfiguring the Law of Non-Refoulement: Procedural and
Substantive Barriers for Those Seeking to Access Surrogate International Human Rights
Protection, 2 J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. 329, (2014); GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, The
Refugee in International Law 143 (2d ed. 1996).
169 Drake & Gibson, supra note 58, at 101.
163
164

48

N.C. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XLVII

refugee status through the adjudicatory process.170 Thus, ultimately
the United States is required under both domestic and international
law to follow the principle of non-refoulement.171 Yet, under the
Trump administration, access to asylum was greatly undermined
before getting to the borders, or even while within the State
territory.172 All these obstacles to asylum seekers at the borders,
including the barriers to approaching the borders, limits to due
process, and the proposal of returning asylum seekers to Mexico
while their proceedings are pending, tend to undermine their rights
under international and domestic laws.173 If the United States uses
Mexico to refoul people from the countries they have fled from, then
the United States is in violation of the principle of non-refoulment,
and thus of international law.174 The mobility of people should not
always be translated to a question of immigration and refugee law.
Rather, each person should be accorded human rights for one’s
shared humanity, irrespective of where the person is located.175 Due
process for migrants is a fundamental right embraced by the
international community, and it is a way to check the constraints
placed on refugees attempting to obtaining protections.176
Some argue that gaps or weaknesses in the 1951 Convention
create room for undermining the protections due to a failure to
safeguard a comprehensive refugee protection plan.177 Although the
principle of non-refoulement requires that States not send refugees
Id.
Id. at 114.
172 Id. at 141.
173 See if. At 114-15.
174 Id. at 120 (citing Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session,
at 160, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) (“A State which directs and controls another State in the
commission of an internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible
for that act if: (a) that State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the
internationally wrongful act; and (b) the act would be internationally wrongful if
committed by that State.”).
175 Id. at 120.
176 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 10–11, Dec. 10, 1948;
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 6, Nov.
4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, art. 5, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, supra note 54; Convention of the Rights of the Child, supra note 64,
at art. 12(2), 40(1).
177 Eric A. Ormsby, The Refugee Crisis as Civil Liberties Crisis, 117 COLUM. L. REV.
1191, 1192 (2017).
170
171
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to a place where they would likely face persecution, under the 1951
Convention, States are not given a direct mandate to examine a
refugees’ asylum application.178 This discrepancy translates to
States not having an affirmative duty to accept asylum seekers.179
Consequently, non-refoulement really does not prevent countries
that do not examine an asylum claim from then removing that
refugee to another safe country, from which the cycle may continue
by further removal from that third country to another.180
2. Border Externalization Issues
Border externalization refers to the measures taken by States to
prevent people from getting to their territories, such as limiting or
stopping migration flow to their countries.181 Border externalization
takes several different forms.182 These actions are often justified as
necessary for ensuring national security, preventing international
human trafficking, deterring migrants from making dangerous
journeys, and assisting transit countries to build their own
mechanism for handling migration.183 On the other hand, border
externalization is often criticized as not being designed to attain the
purported goals.184 For example, refusing to permit entry by a
mother and child less than a mile from the U.S-Mexico border falls
short in fulfilling any of those goals.185 Related to this method of
refugee deterrence is “cooperation based on non-entrée.”186
Although this political strategy may emerge in various forms, it
usually tends to involve some degree of coordination between the
home state and a third or transit state.187 For example, the United
States agreed with Mexican authorities to carry out programs in
Mexico designed to keep away asylum seekers from Central

Id.
Id.
180 Id.
181 Drake & Gibson, supra note 58, at 115.
182 Id. at 118 (noting that boarder externalization includes visa regimes, agreements
requesting third parties to prevent movements trough transit countries, and extensive
airlines screenings).
183 Id. at 116.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Ormsby, supra note 177, at 1204.
187 Id.
178
179
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America fleeing violence to get to the U.S borders.188 The
partnering countries are usually given incentives to foster the home
country’s policy such as promises of better diplomatic relations or
even financial assistance.189
The border externalization policy and U.S. commitment to the
letter and principles of the 1951 Convention were tested earlier in
Sale v. Haitian Center Council Inc.190 In that case, many Haitians
left their country to seek asylum in the United States in the late
1970s.191 Their exodus was in large part due to the ruthlessness and
violence of the then-government in Haiti.192 The United States’
initial reaction was to interdict the Haitians from making the journey
on the high seas, but it later changed this strategy to one of
interdiction and detention of the Haitians off shore at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba.193 This process further changed to one whereby the
United States simply returned these interdicted Haitians to their
country of persecution.194 The latter actions were scrutinized by the
international community as running afoul of the tenets of the
principle of non-refoulement under the 1951 Convention and the
1967 Protocol.195 The Convention provides that “no contracting
State shall expel or return a refugee in any manner whatsoever to
the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened.”196 Despite this explicit language, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that neither the 1951 Convention nor the applicable U.S.
law applied the duty extraterritorially.197 Justice Stevens applied a
188 Id. For example, the bilateral agreement for the Mérida Initiative, between Mexico
and the U.S., intended to improve security at the Mexican Southern border through the
creation of a modernized border structure with enhanced security, more patrols and check
points at popular migration roads. See Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen & James C. Hathaway,
Non-Refoulement in a World of Cooperative Deterrence, 53 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
235, 251 (2015).
189 Ormsby, supra note 177, at 1204.
190 509 U. S. 155 (1993). The United States, although having been very involved in
the drafting of the 1951 Convention, did not ratify the Convention or become a signatory
to the Protocol in 1968. Twelve year later, the United States then adopted implementing
legislation that conformed its immigration policies to the Protocol. Id. at 177.
191 Ormsby, supra note 177, at 1207.
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 See id.
195 See id. at 1207.
196 Convention Against Torture, supra note 77, at art. 3.
197 Ormsby, supra note 177, at 1207. The U.S Immigration Act of 1980 codified the
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narrower interpretation of the 1957 Convention and 1967 Protocol,
stating that the no return “whatsoever” in any manner “referred to
only persons already in the United States.”198 Therefore, the
obligation of non-refoulement did not apply to these interdicted
Haitians as they were not in the United States.199 This interpretation
makes redundant the words “expel or return” as used in the 1951
Convention, as the Court’s emphasis is only on “expel.”200 This
decision was denounced by the UNCHR and international
community as it was said to invite destination States to shut their
doors to asylum seekers and shirk their responsibilities under
international law.201 The UNCHR quickly expressed concern that
“a number of countries, where the admission or presence of certain
groups of refugees have been perceived as incompatible with
national interests or domestic concerns, have ignored or undermined
the principle of non-refoulement.”202
3. Safe Third Country Agreements Issue as a Violation
Another effective deterrence policy utilized by States to cut
back and discourage migration is the implementation of the safe
“third country” or “first country of arrival” assumption. Sending
back the migrant to the first country of arrival provides legal cover
for a country to send back the asylum seeker from their own
territory.203 The ability to send back an asylum seeker to a country
that he or she only transited through may just be an expedient way
to get rid of undesired asylum seekers.204 The problem with a safe
Refugee Convention as modified by Refugee Protocol, into domestic law. Consequently,
the Refugee Convention’s definition of a refugee and made nonrefoulment mandatory. See
Sale v. Haitian Centers Council Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 189 (1993).
198 Drake & Gibson, supra note 58, at 116.
199 The United States Immigration and Nationality Act, § 243(h)(1), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1153(h)(1) [hereinafter INA] (prohibiting the return of any alien to a country where they
would be persecuted).
200 Drake & Gibson, supra note 58, at 117.
201 Id. at 117 n.143.
202 Roman Boed, The State of the Right of Asylum in International Law, 5 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 1 (1994) (citing United Nations High Comm’r for Refugees, Note on Int’l
Prot., submitted to Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme on Aug.
31, 1993, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/815 (1993).).
203 Ormsby, supra note 177, at 1203.
204 See Drake & Gibson, supra note 58, at 133 (noting that transit countries have been
deemed “‘safe third country’” or “‘first country of asylum’” so to provide the legal cover
to deter and send back undesirable asylum seekers).
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third country or first country of arrival is that it could cause
compounding issues, where the refugee is to face repeated or chain
removals to different states.205 Protections against such chain
removal is provided in international law through the principle of
non-refoulement.206 What if, for example, the United States were to
remove a Central American to Mexico, where he or she will likely
face deportation to the unsafe country he or she is fleeing from
persecution?207 It will be a violation of the non-refoulement
principle, given that the eventual result from the first to the last
removal in the chain is going back to the country of persecution.208
There is no hard-and-fast rule internationally or policy-wise that
requires an asylum seeker seek asylum in the first country they
arrive at.209 This view has been buttressed by UNHCR, which
established that:
[A]n examination of the internationally accepted principles
relating to asylum reveals that none of them suggest—much less
prescribe—that the right to seek asylum has to be exercised in any
particular country, or that a person who has been forced to escape
his country to save his life or freedom would forfeit his right to
seek asylum if he does not exercise it in the first country whose
territory he has entered.210

Multilateral and bilateral agreements may alter this rule by
obliging an asylum seeker to apply for asylum in a “safe third
country” or “first country” of arrival.211 Although the United States’
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) clearly states the right to
seek asylum in the United States,212 it also provides exceptions to
that right. One major exception is the “safe third country”
provision.213 Per INA, the removal of an asylum seeker to a third
country should be done based on an agreement between and
amongst countries.214 This provision means in the absence of such

205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214

See Ormsby, supra note 177, at 1203.
See Drake & Gibson, supra note 58, at 135.
Id.
See id. at 135–36.
See id. at 134.
Id. at 134 (citing von Sternberg, supra note 168, at 336.).
See id. at 134.
8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (2017).
Drake & Gibson, supra note 58, at 136.
Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(A) (2017).).
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an agreement with a third country, an asylum seeker should not be
removed to the third country.215 Canada and the United States
entered into a safe third country agreement in 2002, denying those
within the territory of either country the ability to make a claim for
asylum in the other.216 Likewise, the United States and El Salvador
signed a bilateral agreement to fight against the flow of migrants
from Central America by requiring that migrants first seek asylum
there.217
Some protections for the asylum seeker are built into the
provision of the INA. For example, the agreement guarantees that
the individual will not suffer any more persecution and will be given
proper due process in the third country.218 In the same vein, the
regulation means there must be judicial review of any decision to
remove an individual before the actual removal can occur.219 This
due process euphoria may be short lived as the legislative proposal
reintroduced in January 2017 under the Asylum Reform and Border
Protection Act seeks to amend the safe country provision, thus
granting unbridled powers to the Secretary of Homeland Security to
single-handedly proclaim a country a “safe third country.”220 The
consequence of such a unilateral declaration is that access to the
U.S. asylum system is prevented.221 The person ends up being sent
to the third country, as opposed to being able to seek asylum in the
United States.
Under international law, treaties are only binding upon the
parties to them, while customary international law is binding upon
all nations.222 For example, under the principles of international
See id.
Id. at 134 (citing Safe Third Country Agreement, Can.-U.S., Dec. 5, 2002,
https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/42d7b9944.pdf (last visited Sep. 25, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/MM98-F22V]).
217 See Asylum Seekers & Refugees, supra note 157.
218 See id.
219 See id.
220 See Drake & Gibson, supra note 58, at 137 (citing Asylum Reform and Border
Protection Act of 2017, H.R. 391, 115th Cong. (2017).).
221 See id.; see also Press Release, Human Rights First, House Should Reject Bills that
Undermine
U.S.
Protection
of
Refugees,
(Jan.
11,
2017),
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/press-release/house-should-reject-bills-undermine-usprotection-refugees [https://perma.cc/ KQ5V-R7YH].
222 Nazarova, supra note 56, at 1343. See also the Restatement (Third) which states
that customary international law involves a consistent practice in which states engage out
of a sense of legal obligation. Restatement Third of The Foreign Relations Law of the
215
216
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customary law, all States should recognize the right to seek asylum
and to be free from torture.223 Although there is no specific mention
or mandate on custom as a part of the law of the land in the U.S.
Constitution, the expectation is that U.S. courts are to interpret
domestic laws consistent with international law, especially “where
there is no conflicting treaty, judicial precedent or controlling
executive or legislative act.”224 Thus, the United States would be
compelled to follow the tenets of the UDHR as customary
international law.225 In the same vein, the principle of nonrefoulement is part of customary international law, and all States,
whether or not a party to the 1951 Convention, must honor it.
V.

The Influence of the UNHCR on Refugee Law in the
United States
The UNHCR statute provides a litany of function for its office,
such as “[p]romoting the conclusion and ratification of international
conventions for the protection of refugees, supervising their
application and proposing amendments thereto.”226 Likewise, the
UNHCR helps governments handle refugee issues, foster the
admission of refugees in States, collect state data on refugees, as
well as help the works of private organizations dealing with refugee
issues.227 Under Article 35(1), State parties “undertake to cooperate with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees . . . in the exercise of its functions, and shall in
particular facilitate its duty of supervising the application of the
provisions of this Convention.”228 Given the UNHCR’s depth of
knowledge and expertise developed through its involvement with
refugees matters throughout the world, it is only befitting that
deference is given to that knowledge and interpretation prowess.229
United States section 102, 1987.
223 Id. at 1354.
224 Id. at 1357.
225 Id. at 1358.
226 Statute of the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, supra note 50, at art.
8(a).
227 American Courts and the UNCHR, supra note 87, at 1415.
228 The 1951 Convention, supra note 75, art. 35(1). In resolving disputes, the
Convention also provides that any party may refer a dispute regarding interpretation or
application of the Convention to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), should it not be
possible to resolve the dispute otherwise. Id. at art. 38.
229 American Courts and the UNHCR, supra note 87, at 1399-1400.
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In 2016, of the world’s 17.2 million refugees, UNHCR was
estimated to have aided about 12.9 million.230 Thus, the UNHCR
stands in a better position than the individual states in harmonizing
the international refugee administration.231
The organization is marked by a strong history of providing its
view and interpretation to courts; in other cases, the courts directly
reach out to it for assistance with the interpretation of statutes.232
Although the views and interpretation of the UNHCR are not
embraced by all, many countries find its views as very persuasive.233
However, the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol oblige State
parties to “undertake to co-operate with the [UNCHR]” and
“facilitate its duty of supervising the application of the provisions
of [the] Convention.”234 The UNHCR embraces and refers to its
mandate to harmonize the 1951 convention and 1967 Protocol at the
international level:
In furtherance of its core mandate, UNHCR seeks to promote a
common approach to the application of the 1951 Convention and
1967 Protocol . . . thus providing consistency and predictability in
refugee determinations internationally and reducing the
possibility of conflict between decisions made by different States,
between decisions made by a State and the UNHCR, or both.235

UNHCR has an official published handbook which aids in the
interpretation of the 1951 Convention.236 Examining the role of the
UNHCR in some cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court would
be illuminating as to the influence that the UNCHR may have on
the application of the Convention at the national and international
level.

Id. at 1415.
Id. at 1416.
232 Id.
233 Id. at 417. Some scholars argue that deference to the UNCHR’s view should not
necessarily override the interpretation of individual states, and that embracing the UNHCR
in issues of its enforcement and interpretation would encourage states to absolve
themselves from their own responsibility to enforce the Convention. See also Fatma E.
Marouf, The Role of Foreign Authorities in U.S. Asylum Adjudication, 45 N.Y. U. J. INT’L
& POL. 391, 477 (2013).
234 American Courts and the UNHCR, supra note 87, at 1400.
235 Id. at 1418-19 fn. 135.
236 See United Nations High Commission on Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and
Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1 (Jan. 1992).
230
231
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In the 1984 case of INS v. Stevic,237 Stevic came from
Yugoslavia and appealed a deportation decision because of the
“new[ly] mandatory withholding of removal for refugees.”238 The
standard for the immigration law for deportation prior to the
enactment of the Refugee Act was to simply show “a clear
probability of persecution.”239 Although the Refugee Act did not
clearly change the standard, the circuit court held in favor of Stevic,
basing the decision in part on the UNHCR Handbook and the lesser
standard of “well-founded fear” as expressed in the 1967
Protocol.240 On appeal, the UNHCR filed an amicus and argued that
the U.S. Congress’ intent was to apply the definition in the 1951
Convention—a lower standard.241 The Supreme Court overruled the
circuit court holding and determined that an applicant has to
demonstrate a level of risk amounting to a “clear probability” rather
than the simple “well-founded fear” standard required for asylum.242
The Court made no mention of the contrary view of the UNHCR.
The case is often criticized because it apparently authorized the use
of nonconforming domestic law to be used instead of the 1967
Protocol.243
Shortly thereafter, was the case of INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca,244
where the Supreme Court, instead of applying the mandatory
withholding of removal as in Stevic, used the provision of the
Refugee Act, which called for the grant of asylum on a discretionary
manner by the Attorney General.245 In so doing, the Court not only
held in favor of Cardoza-Fonseco, but also in conformity with the
UNHCR recommendations, clearly citing the Handbook in its
analysis.246 Consequently, Cordoza-Fonseca is touted as the
Supreme Court’s deference to international norms and displays the
role of UNHCR in interpreting refugee laws.247 So while Stevic

237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247

467 U.S. 407 (1984).
American Courts and the UNHCR, supra note 87, at 1403.
Id. at 1405.
Id.
Id. at 1403.
INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 430 (1984).
American Courts and the UNHCR, supra note 87, at 1404.
480 U.S. 421 (1987).
Id. at 449–50.
American Courts and the UNHCR, supra note 87, at 1405.
Id.
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ignored UNCHR’s interpretation of Article 33 of the Convention
and the Refugee Act, that same argument was made and redeemed
in the Cardoza-Fonseca case.248
Another case already discussed in which the UNHCR disagreed
with the Supreme Court was in the case of Sale, where the Supreme
Court held contrary to the UNHCR view that the 1951 Convention
does not apply to refugees in the high seas.249 The UNHCR overtly
criticized the decision of the Court, stating that the decision is “a
setback to modern international refugee law which has been
developing for more than forty years.”250
In Negusie v. Holder,251 the issue presented was whether the
“persecutor bar” in the Refugee Act included within its reach
behavior resulting from conduct under duress.252 In this case,
Negusie, a foreign national while in the Eritrean army, was tortured
for two years. He was also compelled to guard prisoners who were
also under persecution because of their membership in a protected
group.253 The foreign national escaped by hiding in a shipping
container bound for the United States.254 In its amicus brief in favor
of Negusie, the UNHCR stated that for the application of the
persecution bar to be effectively employed to the foreign national,
that foreign national must be found individually responsible for the
action, but that such action should stand if there is a defense such as
duress against criminal responsibility.255 The Supreme Court found
that the Refugee Act was ambiguous as to the issue of persecution
carried out under duress and instead based its interpretation on the
Board of Immigration Appeal (“BIA”).256 Although the majority
Id. at 1405–06.
See supra text accompanying notes 183–94.
250 American Courts and the UNHCR, supra note 87, at 1408.
251 555 U.S. 511 (2009).
252 Id. at 514; see also Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (“The
term “refugee” does not include any person who ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise
participated in the persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”).
253 Negusie, 555 U.S. at 514–15.
254 Id.
255 See American Courts and the UNHCR, supra note 87, at 1410; Brief for the Office
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioner, Negusie v. Mukasey, 555 U.S. 511 (No. 07-499), 2008 WL 2550609, at *4–5
[hereinafter UNHCR Amicus Brief].
256 Negusie, 555 U.S. at 516–17.
248
249
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opinion steered away from mentioning the UNHCR, Justice
Stevens’ partial dissent and concurrence favorably cited the
UNHCR Handbook as a source for guidance, and noted that the
persecutor bar standard interpretation has been used by other
ratifying countries to the Convention.257
The Supreme Court has yet to pronounce a clear and consistent
policy towards UNHCR. The Supreme Court’s position varies from
no consideration of UNHCR views in Stevic to much consideration
in Cardoza-Fonseca, then again to no consideration in Sale and
Negusie.258 Consequently, the Supreme Court, as of Negusie,
seemed to have embraced the “vague doctrine of minimal regard for
the UNHCR’s views.”259 What the future holds remains to be seen.
Some scholars also explain the role of the UNCHR as “fairly
marginal,” while others argue that even though the UNHCR’s views
may not always be followed by the United States, it would be
disingenuous to hold that the U.S. government and officials dealing
with refugee policy and decision making do not take their views
seriously.260 While there may be inconsistencies in the views of
UNCHR and the U.S. government, there are still common grounds
of agreement and collaboration in many others.261
VI.

The Unaccompanied Children at the Border and the
Pervasive Scandal
Under Article 1 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(“CRC”), a child is “every human being under the age of eighteen
years, unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is
attained earlier.”262 An unaccompanied child under the U.N.
Committee on the Rights of the Child is “one who is separated from
both parents and other relatives and is not being cared for by an
adult who, by law or custom, is responsible for doing so.”263
257 American Courts and the UNHCR, supra note 87, at 1410; see also Negusie, 555
U.S. at 536–37 (Stevens, J., concussing in part and dissenting in part).
258 American Courts and the UNHCR, supra note 87, at 1410.
259 Id.
260 Scott Busby, The Politics of Protection: Limits and Possibilities in the
Implementation of International Refugees Norms in the United States, 15 BERKELEY J.
INT’L L. 27, 30 (1997).
261 Id. at 32–33.
262 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 64, art. 1.
263 U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 6 (2005):
Treatment of Unaccompanied and Separated Children Outside their Country of Origin,
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Similarly, under U.S. law, an “unaccompanied alien child” is
defined as a child who: (a) has no lawful immigration status in the
United States; (b) has not attained 18 years of age; and (c) with
respect to whom (i) there is no parent or legal guardian in the United
States or (ii) no parent or legal guardian in the United States is
available to provide care and physical custody.264
In 2017 and beyond, the Trump administration unleashed
attacks on the U.S. immigration and asylum system through
executive actions and policies.265 The zero-tolerance policy
announced by the Attorney General in a 2018 memo sparked
widespread family separations.266 The memo demanded that any
migrants arriving in the United States, which included asylum
seekers, be sent to the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) for possible
“criminal prosecution for entry or reentry” into the country.267 This
decision, which was later said to have been deliberately designed to
serve as a deterrence for asylum seekers, culminated in the mass
separation of families.268 Parents who wound up being prosecuted
were carried away from their children, while the children (about
2,600 at the time) were taken into custody.269 Although Congress
was later given the opportunity by an Executive Order to tackle the
issues and a court order was issued to halt the practice, there were
still reportedly ongoing family separations for about a year
thereafter.270 Some parents were separated from their children for
nebulous and uncorroborated reasons like “criminal history, gang

CRC/GC/2005/6 (Sep. 1, 2005).
264 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2) (2021).
265 For example: higher “credible fear” standards in asylum interviews, case quotas
for immigration court judges, restrictions on asylum for domestic violence survivors and
migrants who cross between points of entry, and “safe third country” agreements that
restrict the flow of asylum-seekers from Central America. E.g., A Timeline of the Trump
Administration’s Efforts to End Asylum [hereinafter Asylum Timeline], NATIONAL
IMMIGRANT
JUSTICE
CENTER
(last
updated
Jan.
11,
2021),
https://immigrantjustice.org/sites/default/files/content-type/issue/documents/2021-01/0111-2021-asylumtimeline.pdf [https://perma.cc/DE45-WW7R].
266 Id.; see Memorandum from Jeff Sessions, Att’y Gen., for Federal Prosecutors
Along the Southwest Border (Apr. 6, 2018).
267 Asylum Timeline, supra note 265 at 23.
268 Id.
269 Id.
270 Id.
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affiliation, or even medical issues such as HIV status.”271 This
problem was compounded by subsequent decisions by the
administration like banning asylum eligibility for any migrant who
crosses between ports.272 The 2019 Migrant Persecution Protocols
(“MPP”), also known as the “Remain in Mexico” policy, required
asylum seekers who were inspected at the port of entry return to
Mexico to await the proceedings.273
In May 2019, a memo from USCIS undermined protections
provided to unaccompanied children during the asylum process.274
This memo, which contained new procedures that would impact
how children would access their rights to asylum, failed to
recognize the protections that were designed for these children. For
example, the memo failed to take into consideration the
susceptibility of a child who arrives at the border alone. 275 The
memo also undermined the non-adversarial asylum interview
procedures and exemption from the one-year filing deadline, the
former of which was normally provided to unaccompanied children
in their asylum proceedings.276 Thankfully, these procedures were
short lived. In August of that year, a temporary restraining order
was issued by a federal district court.277 Following a regulatory
change executed as an Interim Final Rule (“IFR”), the adminstration
banned persons who travel through a third country to the United
Id.
Id. at 19 (“In response to groups of asylum seekers from Central America arriving
in the fall of 2018 (known colloquially as caravans), the administration, via proclamation,
banned individuals who do not present themselves at a point of entry from applying for
asylum.”).
273 Asylum Timeline, supra note 265 at 23. This policy tends to undermine the
domestic and international law principle of non-refoulement. See supra text accompanying
notes 150–54; see also Oona Hathaway, Mark Stevens & Preston Lim, COVID 19 and
International Law: Refugee Law - The Principle of Non-Refoulement, Just Security (Nov.
30, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/73593/covid-19-and-international-law-refugeelaw-the-principle-of-non-refoulement [https://perma.cc/BU4H-73Z7] (“It appears likely
that many States have violated the international law prohibition on refoulement during the
course of the COVID-19 pandemic. COVID-19 does not grant States carte blanche to
trample on well-established principles of international refugee law. States that are party to
the 1967 Protocol have an obligation to process asylum claims, even if they are
simultaneously allowed to impose COVID-responsive health protocols on entering
asylum-seekers.”).
274 Asylum Timeline, supra note 265, at 19.
275 Id.
276 Id.
277 Id. at 19–20.
271
272
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States from applying for asylum. This ban included children.278
Subsequently, the United States signed a bilateral agreement with
El Salvador to control migration flow from Central America.279
Another such agreement with the same purpose and intent was
reached with Honduras, blocking asylum seekers from getting to the
United States.280 These agreements were buttressed by the IFR
issued by the DHS and the DOJ, known as the asylum cooperative
agreement (“CACA”), permitting the United States to enter into an
unsafe third-country agreement with Honduras, El Salvador, and
Guatemala.281 The legality of this third-country agreement has been
challenged in federal court.282
These agreements were challenged on the grounds that they
violated the Refugee Act, the Immigration Act, and the Nationality
Act.283 “The asylum-seekers were forcibly sent to some countries,
such as Guatemala, that did not have the infrastructure to receive
and house asylees.”284 Ironically, these asylum seekers are haunted
by thoughts that they would likely encounter the same persecutions
from which they are running from in the first place.285
In March 2020, the U.S. border was closed pursuant to the CDC
request due to the COVID-19 pandemic. However, Customs and
Border Protection (“CBP”) still expelled about 200,000 migrants
and asylum seekers.286 This number included over 13,000
children.287 In November 2020, this systematic expulsion of
children at the border was stopped as a result of an indigenous

Id. at 17.
Id. at 23 (“[T]he United States has entered into an agreement with El Salvador to
have the Central American country develop its asylum process so that migrants will first
seek asylum there.”).
280 Id. at 16.
281 Id. at 15 (“Under this new rule, asylum officers and CBP would have the discretion
to conduct threshold screenings to determine which country will consider an asylum
seeker’s claim.”).
282 Id. at 15` (“The lawsuit, U.T. v. Barr, was filed in the U.S. District Court of
Washington D.C . . . Plaintiffs are asylum seekers who fled to the U.S. and were
unlawfully removed to Guatemala.”).
283 Id.
284 Id. at 13.
285 Id.
286 Id. at 3.
287 Id.
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child’s class action suit seeking asylum.288
With the new administration taking over in January 2021, one
of the early tests of the new administration is the border crisis, which
is fast becoming a humanitarian crisis. Under the Biden
administration, the unaccompanied minors at the southern border
are increasing in rapid numbers.289 These numbers have certainly
skyrocketed since he took office and President Biden announced
that he will not follow the Trump administration policy to send
unaccompanied minors and children back to their countries, adding
that they will be treated humanely.290 In his first press conference
after taking office, President Biden said “nothing has changed”
when compared to previous influxes at the border.291 As of April
2021, the administration is spending approximately 60 million
dollars a week to care for 16,000 children in shelters run by the
HHS.292 The 7,700 beds in the permanent shelters filled up rapidly,
costing about $290 a day per unaccompanied minor.293 The
administration has dealt with the influx by setting up emergency
facilities in convention centers, military bases, and oil workers
camps, with almost 8,500 children at these facilities and with 4,000
more yet to be moved from the crowded border facilities.294
Understandably, because of the emergency need to set up all these
structures and hire a large staff in a short time frame, the ultimate
288 Id. An indigenous child leading a class action suit has been successful in having
the court enjoin the action. See P.J.E.S. v. Wolf, 502 F. Supp. 3d 492 (D.D.C. 2020).
289 See Nick Miroff, Biden Administration Spending $60 Million Per Week to Shelter
Unaccompanied
Minors,
WASH.
POST
(Apr.
8,
2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/border-shelters-cost/2021/04/08/c54eec3a97bd-11eb-8e42-3906c09073f9_story.html [https://perma.cc/CD7R-ELJP].
290 Id.
291 Franco Ordoñez, Biden Says ‘Nothing Has Changed’ But Child Migrants Crossing
Border At Higher Pace, NPR (Mar. 27, 2021), https://www.npr.org
/2021/03/27/981730103/biden-says-nothing-has-changed-but-child-migrants-crossingborder-at-higher-pace [https://perma.cc/R8B4-G9YP]; see also Ted Hesson et al.,
Tensions rise within Biden administration as migrant kids crowd shelters, REUTERS (Sep.
1, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/world/us/tensions-rise-within-biden-administrationmigrant-kids-crowd-shelters-2021-04-15/ [https://perma.cc/VGT6-GVZ9] (“Republicans
blame [President Biden] for the rising numbers, saying he was too hasty in rolling back
former President Donald Trump’s restrictive immigration policies.”).
292 See Miroff, supra note 289 (stating that these temporary shelters, although not
perfect, are still better than the cramped border tents where children are held upon crossing
the border).
293 Id.
294 Id.
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cost is two and a half times more than it would ordinarily cost to
have a permanent shelter.295 The ultimate cost per day works out to
around $775.296
It is estimated that 22,000 to 26,000
unaccompanied minors will arrive at the United States border by
September 2021.297 Having these migrant families at the border is
not new, as it also occurred during the Bush and Obama
administrations, albeit to a lesser extent. Like the previous
presidents, the Biden administration was not prepared to shelter
these numbers.298 The share and perhaps unanticipated growth in
numbers from previous years may be the reason for the
unpreparedness.
In 2008, President George W. Bush responded to the ongoing
problem by calling for “unaccompanied minors” crossing the border
to be released into the “least restrictive setting.”299 In 2014,
President Barack Obama encountered a similar inflow of
unaccompanied children and families fleeing from violence in
Central America.300 Although President Obama tried resolving the
issue by having these immigrants housed in a special detention
camp, this was short lived.301 A California federal judge determined
that this means of accommodating these migrants was in violation
of an agreement prohibiting kids from being held under such
restrictive jail-like settings.302
Consequently, the Obama
administration went with the policy of releasing these migrants into
the country while they wait for their court date notifications.303
As discussed above, the Trump administration ushered in the
zero-tolerance policy for border crossing, as they showed their
disdain for the Obama immigration policy they termed “catch and
Id.
Id.
297 Id.
298 Id. Anne Flaherty, Origins of family separation issue stretch back many years,
Associated Press News (Sep. 1, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/immigration-northamerica-laws-george-w-bush-politics- [PERMALINK - cc]
299 Anne Flaherty, Origins of family separation issue stretch back many years,
Associated Press News (Sep. 1, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/immigration-northamerica-laws-george-w-bush-politics-26b88518310f47018b724e200b28e88f
[https://perma.cc/8YNB-Y839].
300 Id.
301 Id.
302 Id.
303 Id.
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release.” The Trump administration believed that these migrants
took advantage of the immigration system, as they traveled with
children to avoid being arrested, and then would disappear before
their court date. Consequently, children were separated from their
parents, resulting in parents not knowing where their children were.
Upon taking office, the Biden administration permitted
families–in particular, those with minor children–to enter the United
States.304 However, the Biden administration changed its mind,
likely because the numbers seeking to enter the United States
increased dramatically as discussed above. The administration
expressed that the asylum seekers should simply wait where they
were until the administration could ensure humanitarian processing
facility at the border. The administration also insinuated that they
needed to do that first, as the former administration had demolished
the system that was in place.305 The Biden administration was also
applauded for halting the Trump administration’s “Remain in
Mexico” policy, although it was still criticized for blocking and
expelling asylum seekers under the same policy.306 The Biden
administration is therefore said to be propelling the same Trump
administration policy at the Southern border and side-stepping
refugee law by expelling asylum seekers to Mexico.307 The Biden
administration claims a public health authority rationale, as
permitted under 42 U.S.C. § 265, to prohibit individuals from
seeking asylum at the border.308
Under 42 U.S.C. § 265, referred to as simply “Title 42,” the
Surgeon General is authorized to suspend the introduction of
individuals where “there is serious danger of the introduction of a
communicable disease into the United States,” in the interest of
public health.309 The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
304 A Guide to Title 42 Expulsions at the Border: Fact Sheet, American Immigration
Council, (Mar. 29, 2021), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/guidetitle-42-expulsions-border [https://perma.cc/3LVL-3G7X].
305 Id.
306 Human Rights Travesty, supra note 153, at 2.
307 Id.
308 Id.
309 Lucas Guttentag, Coronavirus Border Expulsions: CDC’S Assault on Asylum
Seekers and Unaccompanied Minors, Just Security (Apr. 13, 2020),
https://www.justsecurity.org/69640/coronavirus-border-expulsions-cdcs-assault-onasylum-seekers-and-unaccompanied-minors/
[https;//perma.cc/Y78W-DC4C].
Historically, Title 42 bestowed quarantine powers to handle the spread of cholera and
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announced that it will use the August 2021 order issued by the
Center for Disease Control (“CDC”) under Title 42 to handle
persons seeking protection in the United States.310 Using COVID19 as the health issue, this Title 42 policy resulted in essentially
sealing the borders to asylum seekers. Even though the use of the
Public Health Service Act of 1944 was intended to apply to all
persons, including U.S citizens, arriving from a different country,311
those barred from entering the United States are those crossing the
border from Mexico and Canada.312 Further, the border closure is
not based on scientific public health indicators.313 This process is
like the policy undertaken by the Trump administration.
Consequently, the Biden administration has been accused of
following a “gentler” version of the Trump policy by professing it
has stopped the Remain in Mexico policy.314
When the Trump policy of “Remain in Mexico” was halted,
Texas and Missouri sued the Biden administration, requesting the
court oblige the administration to reinstate the “Remain in Mexico”
policy.315 A federal district judge in Texas ordered the reinstatement
of the program, stating that the Biden administration violated the
law when it put an end to the program.316 The administration
appealed the ruling to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
yellow fever. References to immigration were removed from an early draft of the law to
address concerns that all travelers, not just immigrants, could carry diseases. Id.; see also
Anne Bloomberg, Explainer: What are Title 42 Expulsions?, Jurist, Legal News &
Commentary,
Univ.
Pittsburg
School
of
L.
(May
14,
2021),
https://www.jurist.org/features/2021/05/14/explainer-what-are-title-42-expulsions/
[https://perma.cc/G2B3-8LVF].
310 Human Rights Travesty, supra note 153.
311 Q&A: US Title 42 Policy to Expel Migrants at the Border [hereinafter Q&A: US
Title
42],
HUMAN
RIGHTS
WATCH
(Apr.
8,
2021),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/04/08/qa-us-title-42-policy-expel-migrants-border
[https://perma.cc/MPF4-29QB].
312 Id. The Irony of this policy is that the U.S. Department of State warns U.S. citizens
in it travel advisory not to travel to some of the same towns in Mexico where these asylum
seekers stay and wait for their immigration court hearings. See Delivered to Danger, supra
note 152.
313 Human Rights Travesty, supra note 153.
314 Id.
315 Uriel J. Garcia, Revival of “remain in Mexico” policy could have deadly
consequences for asylum-seekers, advocates warn, Texas Tribune (Aug. 25, 2021),
https://www.texastribune.org/2021/08/25/remain-in-mexico-supreme-court-ruling/
[https://perma.cc/F6EL-55LU].
316 Id.
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ordered an expedited consideration of the appeal and found in favor
of Texas and Missouri.317 The administration appealed the case to
the U.S. Supreme Court, which decided in August 2021 that the
“memorandum rescinding the Migrant Protection Protocols was not
arbitrary and capricious.”318 The Biden administration argued in
briefs that the president has “clear authority to determine
immigration policy.”319 The American Civil Liberties Union
(“ACLU”) has asked the administration to demonstrate a “fuller
rationale for ending “Remain in Mexico” that could withstand court
scrutiny.”320 According to a human rights organization report, at
least 1,544 migrants have been either raped, killed or kidnapped as
a result of being sent to Mexico under the “Remain in Mexico”
Policy.321
The quintessential question is what lasting and enduring
solutions should be carried out to end this cyclical pattern at the
southern border?
A. Some Recommendations on How to Effectively Manage the
Border Crisis
Some recommendations to resolve the border problems for
families and unaccompanied minors, among other due process
issues, include:
Regularly train border agents on human rights issues and how
to relate to vulnerable populations “in the conduct of human
mobility.”322 They should understand the risks that some
unaccompanied children may be forced to endure such as pressed
involvement in drug rings or human trafficking organized by
crime rings.323

317 Id. The States argued that their states are burdened by the release of these migrants
because of the impact it has on its state’s resources like education and health care. Id.
318 Mark Sherman, Supreme Court orders “Remain in Mexico” policy reinstated,
Associated Press News (Aug. 24, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/mexico-courtsimmigration-us-supreme-court-a3fe33081fa2909c17e8c08a2c37f818
[https://perma.cc/E5FD-E5VV].
319 Id.
320 Id.
321 Garcia, supra note 315.
322 IACHR Report, supra note 153, at 105.
323 Id. Such advocacy from border patrol agents would assist in transforming policies
and services that affect refugees at regional and international levels. Their advocacy during
times of numerous forced displacements could influence governments, NGOs and other
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Make child-sensitive immigration court proceedings that
makes it conducive for children to participate effectively.324 The
immigration judges and others involved should be trained in how
to handle children who may have suffered trauma.325
Increase federal assistance to States that have received
unaccompanied children as well as families.326 Ancillary to this
is the suggestion that legal assistance be given to unaccompanied
minors, at no cost, for collecting documents and evidence to use
in defense at a hearing with the immigration judge.327
Where a family or unaccompanied child has filed a lawsuit
against a U.S. immigration official for abuses, mistreatment, or
other causes, a grant of automatic stay of removal proceedings
should be granted to the claimant.328 The removal of such a
plaintiff to a third country while non-immigration proceedings are
in progress may greatly undermine the claimant’s ability to
participate (due process) or obtain a remedy through the courts.329
Confront the actual cause of displacement in Honduras,
Guatemala, and El Salvador by infusing great support for
effective programs that would fight against violence, encourage
economic prospects, bolster justice systems, and protect
communities from climate change.330
Build and support increased asylum and refugee-hosting

stakeholders to embrace procedures that would protect and enhance the needs of migrants
and refugees.
324 Id.
325 Id. at 95, 107–08. The Inter American Commission on Human Rights in its 2015
report indicated on p. 95 that “unaccompanied are still subject to an inherently adversarial
and intimidating environment in the courtroom, in which they may be examined and crossexamined and that overall, USCIS officers (as well as officers of other federal agencies
involved) lack sufficient training on issues regarding child development and childsensitive, age-appropriate questioning. Id. at 95.
326 Id. at 109.
327 Id. at 107.
328 Id. at 110.
329 Id. The Inter American Commission on Human Rights, its members noted in their
2015 report that in a complaint filed regarding the treatment of unaccompanied children in
the custody of CBP officials, 116 of the children between the ages of 15 and 17 endured
some form of abuse or mistreatment from the officers. Id. at 94.
330 The Real Solution: Regional Response Rather than Border Closures, Mass
Incarceration, and Refugee returns, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, (Apr. 2019),
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/real-solution-regional-response-rather-borderclosures-mass-incarceration-and-refugee [https://perma.cc/ZRY3-4YYB].
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capability in Mexico and the other Latin American countries.331
This is critical, given that asylum filings in countries like Mexico
have increased by over 700 percent since 2014.332
In the same vein, the United States should work with UNCHR
to develop strong regional capabilities for asylum and refugee
protections and systems.333
Protect access to asylum by fighting against smuggling and
human trafficking forces that prevent fleeing from dangerous
countries.334
“Manage U.S. asylum arrivals effectively through a genuine
humanitarian response that upholds U.S. law and provides order
including:”335 (1) Reestablish timely systematic asylum
processing at ports of entry and make sure there are prevailing
human conditions at all DHS facilities; (2) end the deleterious
policy of the “Remain in Mexico” scheme and “metering”
policies that put people in harm’s way as they seek to cross
between ports of entry or put their lives in in danger as they wait
in Mexico; (3) fund and support NGOs and shelters in the United
States; and (4) usher in orderliness through effective procedures
that provide expedient, fair, and effective U.S. adjudications.336
Increase, instead of eliminating, immigration judges and
interpreters.337 It is quintessential that the judges understand and
ensure due process in their courtrooms, and that this is backed by
interpreters.338
To enable eligible refugees to receive protection early in the
process, support a legal representation initiative that makes
comprehensive legal orientation representation (LOPs) available
to all, including those in custody of DHS and/or Customs and
Border Protection.339
Hold federal agencies accountable by monitoring and
evaluating local partners and agencies involved with the
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resettlement of refugees, thereby making sure they are abiding by
their contractual obligations.340
Streamline the security check process to achieve
effectiveness.341 Because each new administration tends to add
new layers of security screening for refugees, the process appears
to be repetitive and cumbersome. This process should be
reexamined and revised for efficiency and effectiveness without
undermining its potency.342
Suggestions have been made about creating a worldwide
resource pool for refugees.343
All States would share
proportionately the burdens of refugees, but perhaps it would be
best to create a global fund to which each State would contribute
and from which they could withdraw costs incurred for the
protection of those in need.344

B. Recommendations—The Strategic Role of Advocates
In this current atmosphere of jurisdictional regulation and
deterrence policy towards asylum seekers, advocates must be
aggressive in challenging both the law and practice that tends to
limit access to asylum.345 Advocates should push the courts to
recognize and embrace due process to asylum seekers, including
“the right to seek asylum, a full and fair hearing, and access to
counsel.”346 Without proper due process, the United States is
unlikely to adequately meet its obligation under the law “to ensure
it does not return people to persecution.”347
Appointing counsel to everyone in immigration proceedings
would be ideal. Access to counsel is vital and critical to these
asylum seekers, whose destiny most likely is determined by the kind
of help and representation they are given.348 Fleeing from one’s own
country is already tough, especially for children, individuals in
detention, and other vulnerable populations. To add to that the
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challenge of navigating the complex immigration system that they
usually know nothing about is unrealistic. Advocates should engage
with policy makers about human rights protections while also
holding the government accountable.
An advocate should frame the issues to address the concerns of
decisionmakers and follow international norms in the process.
These two objectives were accomplished in Sale v. Haitian Center
Council.349 In Sale, Haitians were offshore in Guantanamo for two
reasons: temporary protection was at least granted, even if only
offshore, and secondly, that action dissuaded other Haitians from
trying to reach the United States.350 This case established that the
United States still chose to comply with refugee protection based on
the principle of non-refoulement, although it did so with the
refugees outside the United States, which in itself was
commendable.351 In so doing, the United States took off the
concerns against promoting illegal immigration.352
VII. Conclusion
The current wave of refugees is a global phenomenon that is
predicted to grow, given the prevailing factors that force people to
migrate in the first place. These factors, including the increase in
conflicts propelled by limited resources in developing countries, the
impacts of climate change, domestic and international terrorism,
and globalization, all forecast a bleak future for migrants and
refugees.353 The previous openness with which States accepted
refugees has waned and moved, in most cases, to following refugee
deterrence policies.354
The Trump administration mishandled the refugee and
humanitarian crisis, causing people to flee from political upheavals,
human rights abuses, economic poverty, and climate change from
countries like Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala.355 By
implementing the border externalization policy, entering into safe
third-party agreements, and contravening the principle of non349
350
351
352
353
354
355
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refoulement, the administration made things worse. The United
States turned a blind eye to the human rights abuses endured by
these persons fleeing their countries and penalized them as they
sought U.S. protections. In doing so, the federal government
enabled family separations, detention, and ultimately, the
traumatization of children and families.356
Under the principle of non-refoulement, the best interest of the
child standard and immigration policies should be applied in
accordance with human rights standards. This principle of nonrefoulement is the heart of international refugee law. Nonrefoulment and international law intentionally put in place a system
whereby any migrant seeking protection is, at the very least, given
provisional shelter while awaiting adjudication of that protection
claim. Only after due process and fair consideration are given to
the asylum claimant can a State be certain that its process does not
contravene international legal obligations.357 Non-refoulement is
better described as “a rare right that is not predicated on the arrival
of a refuge at a State’s territory, nor on the formal adjudication of
their status.”358 Indeed, the UNHCR was quick to state in March
2020 that “a ‘blanket measure’ barring asylum seekers at risk of
refoulement—such as the U.S. government’s expulsion of asylum
seekers—is discriminatory and does not meet international
standards.”359
Asylum is founded on the United Nations Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees, the Refugee Convention, and the 1967
Protocol to the Convention. Congress enacted the Refugee Act of
1980 and sought to bring the domestic statute in conformity with
international law.360 This is why some scholars promote the view
that courts should interpret U.S. asylum laws in conformity with
international law.361 Both the 1951 Convention and the 1967
Protocol are informed by human rights principles, which then
inform domestic laws.362 Worldwide, the most applied body of
international law in domestic venues is the international refugee
356
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358
359
360
361
362
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regime.363 The UNHCR, with its developed expertise, plays an
important role in the implementation of the refugee regime
worldwide and is better placed in harmonizing the international
regime.364 As discussed, the UNHCR has played a pivotal role in
interpreting the text of the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol and
providing its interpretations to courts. The U.S. Supreme Court
seems to have a love-hate relationship in considering the views of
the UNHCR, and therefore does not tend to “articulate a clear and
consistently applied posture toward the UNHCR.”365
This article highlights that the refugee problem continues to be
a challenge to the international community. As States continue to
find ways to deter migration and refugees from their borders, they
tend to run afoul of international and human rights laws. States
must be intentional about upholding the tenets of the 1951
Convention and other related bodies of law that protect and honor
refugees. Until the root humanitarian problems are effectively
tackled, forced migration and asylum seekers will remain
widespread and unavoidable. According to the UNHCR, of the
current 79.5 million people who have been forced to escape from
their homes globally, more than 26 million are identified as
refugees; of those, around 80 percent are accommodated in
developing countries.366 These developing countries, as would be
imagined, already have significant problems of their own.367
For the United States, such an imbalance of global
responsibility-sharing to protect the most vulnerable population of
the world may have unintended consequences on regional security
and stability, and thus should influence the foreign policy of the
United States.368 The United States, as the most powerful nation in
the world, should take its leadership position and model for the rest
of the world to follow.
363 See James Hathaway et.al, Supervising the Refugee Convention: Introduction, 26
J. REFUGEE STUD. 323, 323 (2013).
364 American Courts and the UNHCR, supra note 87, at 1411-13.
365 Id. at 1410.
366 Mathema & Carratala, supra note 109, at 1.
367 See id. See also Resettlement in the United States, U.N. High Commissioner For
Refugees (March 2020), https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/resettlement-in-the-unitedstates.html [https://perma.cc/7BHM-KEPP] (providing global refugee resettlement
statistics).
368 Mathema & Carratala, supra note 109, at 1.

